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Article 8

RECENT CASES

INTERSTATE COMMERCE
INTERSTATE V. INTRASTATE COMMERCE
The Indiana Supreme Court has recently manifested its unwillingness
to grapple with the tax problems presented by the imposition of the state
gross income tax' upon interstate commerce. In Gross Income Tax Division
v. J. L. Cox & Son, 86 N. E. 2d 693 (Ind. 1949) a non-resident taxpayer
was employed by War Emergency Pipe Lines Inc. to haul pipe during the
construction of the Big Inch pipeline. This pipe had been shipped from outof-state manufacturers, by rail, to various railheads in Indiana under bills of
lading specifying the railheads as the destination of the shipments. Cox then
unloaded the pipe and transported it to the pipeline right-of-way by motor
vehicle. The Indiana Supreme Court assumed, for purposes of its decision,
that the tax would be invalid if Cox were engaged in interstate Commerce. 2
It then proceeded to discuss the various indicia of interstate and intrastate
commerce, labelled Cox's activities intrastate, and upheld the tax.
In order to determine whether a given shipment is in interstate commerce
one must seek out its essential nature.3 Among the elements commonly used
in this process are the intent of the parties, 4 their general course of dealing,'
their contractual relations,6 the continuity of transit,7 and any other factors
ANN. (Burns Repl. 1943) § 64-2602.
2. The latest United States Supreme Court decision, Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v.
Stone, 69 Sup. Ct. 1264 (1949), casts much doubt on the validity of the assumption.
There the Court was evenly divided between the multiple and direct burden tests of tax
validity. The advocates of the multiple burden test upheld a Mississippi tax on interstate
commerce because there was no opportunity for another state to tax the same transaction. The dissenters relied upon the direct burden test. And Mr. Justice Burton
turned the balance in favor of validity, concurring only because he regarded the activities
in question as intrastate commerce.
For a general discussion of the gross receipts tax problem and the various tests
proposed, see Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 HARv. L. REv. 501,
710 (1947); Lockhart, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transportation and Colniminication, 57 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1943) ; Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate
Transactions,47 CoL. L. REv. 211 (1947).
3. This means simply that the whole group of facts relating to the transaction must
be considered in determining the character of the commerce involved. Atl. C. L. R. R. v.
Standard Oil Co., 275 U. S. 257 (1927); Hughes Bros. v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 469

1. IND. STAT.

(1926).
4. United States v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 230 Fed. 940 (E. D. La. 1916) (the intent of the
parties, formed prior to the initial movement, is of obvious and usually controlling importance.)
5. The general course of dealing between the parties may characterize a shipment as
interstate, the true character of which, when taken by itself, is undeterminable. Baer Bros.
v. Denver & R. G. Ry., 233 U. S. 479 (1914) ; La. R. R. Comm. v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 229
U. S.336 (1913).
6. Gulf, Colo. & S. F. Ry. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403 (1907) (The contractual relations
are used as a guide to the intent of the parties as to the ultimate destination of the
shipment.)
7. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Schnipper, 51 F.2d 749 (E. D. Ill. 1931), aff'd, 56 F.2d 30
(7th Cir. 1932).
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tending to show the entire scheme of things intended and accomplished.8
The Indiana court thought the original bills of lading decisive as to the
ultimate destination of these shipments and held that they were divested of
their interstate character at the railheads. While bills of lading are of some
persuasive value, they do not alone control as to the question of ultimate
destination."0 A bill of lading may not show the intent of the parties as to
the destination of a shipment,"' particularly where, as here, the use of succeeding carriers is necessary;" nor does it indicate the contractual relations involved, 13 the established course of business between the parties,' 4 nor the
cause and purpose of stops at intermediate points.'" Had the court considered
these factors it would have discovered a predetermined plan, designed to
insure a continuous flow of pipe from point of manufacture to place of
intended use. 16 Under these circumstances a single bill of lading is not a
reliable guide to the essential nature of the commerce and is not decisive as
to its ultimate destination.
Where there is only a single contract of sale and a shipment made
thereunder, the contract might well embody the intent of the parties as to
the destination of the shipment.' 7 Here, however, Cox, with the seller's
8. See Tarnay, Methods For Differentiating Interstate Transportation From Intrastate Transportation,6 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 553 (1938).
9. Gross Income Tax Division v. J. L. Cox & Son, 86 N. E.2d 693, 698 (Ind. 1949):
At the time said materials were ordered from the factory by W. E. P.
Inc. it was specified in a bill of lading that such materials should be
transported by rail to W. E. P. Inc. at the designated railheads. It
thus appears from the stipulation of facts that the bills of lading
issued for all of the interstate shipments made the railheads the destination for such shipments.
10. Western Oil Ref. Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U. S. 346 (1917) (What is actually done,
not the bill of lading, controls in a case where the shipper intended from the beginning
that the journey should be continued past the point shown on the original bill of lading.)
11. United States v. Erie R. R., 280 U. S. 98 (1929).
12. D. S. Milling Co. v. N. Pac. R. R., 152 Wis. 528, 140 N. W. 1105 (1913):
Where the services of more than one carrier are necessary to complete the journey, the destination named in the original bill of lading
may be intended as a transfer point and nothing more.
13. Gulf, Colo. & S. F. Ry. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403 (1907).
14. Galveston H. & S. A. Ry. v. Wood, Hagenborth Cattle Co., 105 Tex. 178, 146
S. W. 538 (1912).
15. B. & 0. S. W. R. R. v. Settle, 260 U. S. 166 (1922).
16. Brief for Appellants, pp. 28-34, 54-71, Gross Income Tax Division v. J. L. Cox
& Son, 86 N. E.2d 693 (Ind. 1949). The stipulations and exhibits in the appellant's brief
show that the pipeline right of way was first laid out and the railheads were then located
at convenient points along appurtenant railroads in order to expedite the flow of materials
to the pipeline. Each shipment was earmarked, at the manufacturer's, for a certain
portion of the pipeline, and they were timed so as to provide a steady supply of pipe as
needed. Though there were no through combined rail and truck routings, motor vehicles
were the only practical means of transportation on the final leg of the journey and the
shipments were delayed at the railheads only when there were not enough trucks available
for their immediate transportation to the pipeline.
17. Gulf, Colo. & S. F. R. R. v. Texas, supra note 13.

RECENT CASES
knowledge, intended to reship the pipe to the place where it was to be used.'
In such a case the over-all plan of the one controlling the movement rather
than the contract or job of a connecting carrier determines the character of
the commerce.' " Accordingly, the importance attached to the nature of Cox's
work and his contract with the War Emergency Pipe Lines was inappropriate
because he was involved in only one link in the chain of transit constituting
the substance of this traffic. The essential nature of this commerce while on
the final leg of the journey was not determined by Cox's contract or the fact
that he operated solely within the state of final destination. 20 This becomes
more apparent after considering the effect of stopping these shipments at the
railheads and transferring the pipe to Cox's trucks. Here, the continuity of
transit as shown by the cause and purpose of the stops is controlling 2' and
stops which do not break the continuity of transit do not affect the character
of the commerce. 22 A mere assumption of possession by the owner at a point
23
short of the ultimate destination will not break the continuity of transit,

18. Cox's contract provided that he was to make all arrangements for any necessary
storage of the pipe and that he must pay the storage charges. This, too, is inconsistent
with the idea that the railheads were regarded as the ultimate destination of the shipments.
19. In B. & 0. S. W. R. R. v. Settle, supra note 15, the factual situation was similar
to that here, but the interruption and change in carriers was made deliberately in order
to change the nature of the commerce and enable the shipper to evade interstate freight
rates. The court held the entire journey interstate in nature. The shipper's original
intention, which he carried out by moving the goods to their ultimate destination, was
the controlling factor. The contract and local nature of the activities of the second
carrier were of no significance. Under this doctrine War Emergency Pipe Lines could
not, by hiring Cox, change the character of the shipments on the last leg of the journey
in order to escape interstate freight rates. But that was not the purpose for which Cox
was hired because he operated under an Interstate Commerce Commission permit which
fixed his rates. Thus the principal case cannot be reconciled with the Settle case unless
these shipments are considered in interstate commerce for the purpose of enforcing
Interstate Commerce Commission rates, and in intrastate commerce for purposes "of state
taxation of income derived from that transportation.
20. Buckingham Transp. Co. v. Black Hills Transp. Co., 66 S. D. 230, 281 N. W.
94, 97 (1938) :
If that which is done is in performance of a preconceived and preannounced intention to move the property to the selected destinations,
the essential . . . unity of transportation will not be destroyed by a

multiplication of carriers and contracts, by changes in form or mode
of transportation, by a re-billing or a reshipping, or by any cessation
of movement incidental to a mere form or mode of transportation.
21. This test has been criticized as being a shield behind which a court can do as it
pleases. Tarnay, supra note 8, at 556. That would not seem to be the case, however,
where the continuity of transit is conditioned on the cause and purpose of the stop.
Standard Oil Co. v. Atl. C. L. R.R., 13 F.2d 633 (W. D. Ky. 1926), aff'd in part, rood. in
part, rev'd in part 275 U. S. 257 (1927).
22. Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1, 10 (1933) ; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Schnipper,
supra note 7; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 (1886) :
A temporary cessation of the actual forward movement which is
reasonable, in good faith, and solely in furtherance of the intended
transportation does not break the continuity of transit.
23. B. & 0. S. W. R. R. v. Settle, supra note 17.
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nor will a stop to allow a change in the means of transportation, 24 to expedite

or promote the safety of the journey, 25 or to sort, grade, or process when
necessary to or an incident of further interstate shipment. 21 Such delays may
be simply mechanical incidents of an otherwise continuous journey.27 In
spite of immediate reshipment, however, interruptions for some purposes may
break the continuity of transit," as where property in the course of interstate shipment is stopped for business purposes," for the convenience of the
owner, 0 or for final disposition or use.2 ' If one were in the pipe distributing
business a stop at a distributing point would be for business purposes and
would end an interstate shipment. 2 But War Emergency Pipe Lines was not
in the pipe distributing business; it was building a pipeline and neither made
nor intended to make final disposition or use of the pipe at the railheads.
The ultimate destination of each carload of pipe was known to it when
the shipments originated, and the stops at the railheads were made solely in
furtherance of the transportation to that destination. Therefore, the delays
at the railheads afforded no business advantage or convenience disassociated
from the transportation and were merely mechanical incidents of the journey.
As such they did not break the continuity of transit or effect the character
of this commerce, which was essentially a through interstate movement from
manufacturer to pipeline right-of-way.
24. Hughes Bros. v. Minnesota, supra note 3 (logs in river transferred to boat)
Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 82 (1903) (logs in river transferred to
railroad).
25. Champlian Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U. S. 366 (1922).
26. Southern Pac. Term. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 219 U. S. 498 (1910);
State v. Anderson Clayton Co., 92 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1937) ; Oregon-Wash. R. & N. Co.
v. Pac. Grain Co., 38 F. Supp. 230 (D. Ore. 1940) ; State v. S. A. & A. P. R. R., 32 Tex.
Civ. App. 58, 73 S. W. 572 (1903). But for cases where processing, etc., did break the
continuity of transit, see Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Schnipper, spra note 7; Diamond Match
Co. v. Ontonagon, supra note 26; B. & 0. R. R. v. United States, 15 F. Supp. 674
(N. D. N. Y. 1936).
27. For additional cases see Note, 171 A. L. R. 283 (1947) ; Note, 155 A. L. R. 936
(1943) ; Note 60 A. L.R. 1465 (1926).
28. Chicago M. & S. P. Ry. v. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334 (1914) ; Texas & N. 0.R. R. v.
Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. 111 (1912); Ohio R. R. Comm. v. Worthington, 225 U. S.
101 (1911).
29. Carey v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., 250 N. Y. 345, 165 N. E. 805 (1922) (grain stored to
await a rise in price).
30. This means a convenience disassociated from the transportation. United Mills v.
Tax Comm., 54 Ohio App. 1, 5 N. E.2d 940 (1934).
31. Brown v. Huston, 114 U. S. 622 (1884).
32. Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Standard Oil, 275 U. S. 257 (1927). See also Buchanan
v. Carson, 230 S. W. 2d 115 (Tenn. 1949) in which the Army shipped gasoline, by barge,
into Tennessee where it was transferred to storage tanks and held awaiting shipment to
various airports by truck. When placed in the storage tanks it was not known to which
airfield the gasoline would be shipped, and the Army could, and did on occasion, divert
the gasoline to other places. Since the destination was unknown at the time of the stop
it was characterized as one for the convenience of the owner terminating the interstate
journey, and a tax similar to the one in the principal case was properly levied on the
income of the second carrier.
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At best, the classification of Cox's activities as intrastate is of doubtful validity. But assuming the label proper, this basis of decision is of
little assistance in formulating a workable policy for state taxation of goods
moving in interstate commerce. The tax policy question must, in the final
analysis, be decided by the federal courts and, in particular, the United States
Supreme Court; and until some guidance comes from their decisions, it may
be the part of wisdom for state courts to render technical decisions based on
the interstate/intrastate dichotomy, thus evading the basic federal problems
of sensible apportionment of taxes on interstate commerce.

LEGISLATION
THE INDIANA ANNEXATION ACT OF 1949
The problem of enlarging the area of municipalities has often troubled
state legislatures, for in seeking a solution the interests of the residents of
the area in question must be balanced against the interests of the people in the
community to which the land is sought to be annexed. The conflicting interests involved are often complex, for burdens of taxation may outweigh
the advantages of urban society conferred upon the territory to be acquired.
Conversely, by becoming a part of the municipality, the residents of the
adjacent lands may be given the benefits of fire and police protection, water
and sanitary facilities without contributing sufficient revenue to the city
treasury to compensate for this added service.
The 1949 session of the Indiana Legislature enacted a bill to govern
the procedure by which such adjacent lands may be annexed to a city.' The
act provides for two methods to effectuate the annexation. The interested
owners of real estate adjacent to the city may request annexation by presenting
to the common council of the city a petition bearing the signature of fiftyone per cent of the persons owning property in the territory and requesting
a special ordinance annexing the contiguous territory described in the petition.
If the proposed annexation is approved by the common council, the land is
annexed. If the ordinance is not passed within sixty days, the petitioners
may file, with the circuit or superior court of the county wherein such
territory is situated, a duplicate of the petition in which reasons supporting
annexation are stated. After appropriate notice to the 'city officials, the
court is required to hear the petition and give judgment upon the question of
annexation according to the evidence produced by both parties. Should the
court be satisfied that the annexation will be for the best interest of the city
and will cause no manifest injuries to property holders in either the city or the
1. There are, of course, other methods by which land may be annexed to a city.
For example, the boundaries may be enlarged by an ordinance originating from within
the council itself. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 48-701.

